Economia dell’Informazione (UniCa – EFPP – EM)

 

“Incentives are the essence of economics” (Canice Predergast, 1998)

 

N.B. La lezione del 23/10 verrà recuperata il 12/11.

I seminari si terranno nei giorni 11-12/11

Lectures Slides

Detailed Programme

Introduction Slides: Intro 1-3
Static Games Slides 4

Carmichael ch. 1-3

Dynamic Games Slides 5

Carmichael ch. 4 + 6

Modeling Hidden Information Slides 6

B&B ch. 13C

Mohlo Appendix

Adverse selection I:

Akerlof’s model

Slides 7

Mohlo ch. 2

Adverse Selection II:

Wilson’s model

Medical malpractice

Slides 8

Mohlo ch. 3 & 4

Lieber, E., (2014). Medical Malpractice Reform, the Supply of Physicians, and Adverse Selection. Journal of Law & Economics 57:  501-527

Adverse Selection III:

The insurance destruction effect

Slides 9

B&B ch. 13D

Signaling:

Spence’s model

+ empirical test

Slides 10

Mohlo ch. 5

Tyler, J., Murnane, R., Willett, J., (2000), Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), pp. 431–468

Moral Hazard I:

Incentive Contract: Theory

Slides 11

B&B ch. 16A-16C

Moral Hazard II:

External control mechanisms

+ empirical tests

Slides 12

Molho ch. 9 – 10

Karlan & Zinman, (2009). Observing the Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With A Consumer Credit Field Experiment. Econometrica, Vol. 77, pp. 1993–2008.

Schneider, H., (2012). Agency Problems And Reputation In Expert Services: Evidence From Auto Repair. The Journal of Industrial Economics, LX: 0022-1821
Reputational Markets Slides 13

Greif, A., (1993). Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 525-548.

Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Phillip Leslie. (2009). “Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 237-67.

Bolton, G., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A., (2004). How Effective Are Online Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation. Management Science n. 50(11), pp. 1587–602.

 

 

Textbooks:

Resources on doing a good presentation

Readings for students’ presentations

Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, (2014). Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 2014), pp. 65-93

Vincent Conitzer, Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases, Marketing Science, Vol. 31, No. 2 (March-April 2012), pp. 277-292

Acquisti, Alessandro, (2014). Inducing Customers to Try New Goods, Review of Industrial Organization, 44 (2), 131–146, 2014

Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman (2016). The Economics of Privacy. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 54, No. 2 (JUNE 2016), pp. 442-492

Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, (2005). Conditioning Prices on Purchase History. Marketing Science, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2005), pp. 367-381

Nick Feltovich, Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, (2002). Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 2002), pp. 630-649

Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., (2013). Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2).

 


Presentations timetable

11/11/2019 h.8-10

Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, (2014). Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 2014), pp. 65-93

Vincent Conitzer, Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases, Marketing Science, Vol. 31, No. 2 (March-April 2012), pp. 277-292

 

 

12/11/2019 h.8-10

Acquisti, Alessandro, (2014). Inducing Customers to Try New Goods, Review of Industrial Organization, 44 (2), 131–146, 2014

Nick Feltovich, Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, (2002). Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 2002), pp. 630-649

Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., (2013). Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2).

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